

3 **Examining the sensitivity of global CO₂**
4 **emissions to trade restrictions over multiple**
5 **years**

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
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30 **Uncertainty and limitations**

31 Several factors result in uncertainty in our analysis and findings. First, the CO₂ emissions considered
32 here are focused on the source of fuel combustion for economic production. In other words, CO₂
33 emissions from activities that are not directly related to economic output, like private transport and
34 residential activities, are not included in our study. Thus, the emissions we considered in our simulations,
35 when summed, are lower than the actual regional and global emissions. For example, 9.9 Pg of global
36 CO₂ emission were omitted in this study for the year 2014¹. However, since the aim of our study was to
37 test the impact of trade on emissions, only including emissions from economic production is sufficient
38 to capture the signature under different trade-related scenarios. Second, our trade restrictions scenarios
39 were designed with an additional 25% tariff, but the impacts on emission might be different with higher-
40 level tariffs imposed. To test the robustness of our results, we added two more hypothetical trade
41 restriction scenario with higher levels of tariff imposed: GTB-35 and GTB-50 (+35% and 50% for each
42 region and traded product, respectively). Under these two tariff levels, even though the simulated
43 magnitudes vary under each scenario, the relative changes for each region are robust and monotonic with
44 the imposed tariff increasing (Supplementary Table 2 and Supplementary Figure 1). The robustness of
45 simulated GDP changes by GTAP have been tested with a similar method in our previous study under
46 several hypothetical scenarios with different levels of additional tariff for China and the US¹⁶. Therefore,
47 the results of our sensitivity tests support our interpretation that changing the level of tariffs only affects
48 the numerical magnitude of results but not the reliability of this study. Third, the emission calculation
49 under each scenario assumes homogeneity of products sold into different markets. This assumption
50 underlines the differences between domestic products and trade products ², especially considering the
51 “processing trade” ³. This limitation will be amplified with a higher level of aggregation. Therefore, we
52 used the most detailed data in the GTAP database (65 production sectors) in this study to reduce this
53 limitation and capture heterogeneity to the greatest extent possible. Besides, note that some regions with
54 negative values of elasticity under specific scenario were not included here.




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57 **Supplementary Figure 1: The relative changes in GDP of individual regions from Actual to each**

58 **scenario under trade restriction series test. Detailed results can be found in the Supplementary Table**

59 2 of this study.

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62 **Supplementary Figure 2: Increasing share of regions with emission intensity above the global**

63 **average as a percentage (%) of total global trade in this study.** This figure highlights the effects of

64 changes in export structure over time. Each region's share of global exports is shown as a separate

65 stacked bar for each year. Darker colors represent regions with relatively higher emission intensities

66 compared to the global average. The darkest color is the sum of emission-intensive regions, which are

67 defined as regions with emission intensities higher than the global average for each year. Detailed results

68 can be found in the "Export" tab of Supplementary Table 2.

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70 **References**

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